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EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. 
ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC.: (5-4) 
IN DIVERSITY CASES, ONLY ONE 
PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER 
MUST SATISFY THE AMOUNT IN 
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT 
BLAYRE BRITTON* 
In two cases consolidated as Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court explored the amount in controversy 
requirement in cases with multiple plaintiffs.1 These cases resolved a 
division between the Courts of Appeals over the proper 
interpretation of 28 U.S.C § 1367.2 
In 1991, a group of approximately 10,000 fuel dealers invoked 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction of the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Florida to file a class-action suit 
against Exxon Corporation.3 The dealers alleged that Exxon had 
intentionally overcharged them for fuel.4 After a unanimous jury 
verdict for the dealers, “the District Court certified the case for 
interlocutory review asking if it had properly exercised § 1367 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims of class members who did not 
meet the jurisdictional minimum.”5 The Eleventh Circuit upheld 
supplemental jurisdiction, holding that § 1367 authorized 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims of class members who do not 
meet the amount in controversy, provided that the district court had 
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 1. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005) (consolidated with 
Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.) 
 2. Id. at 2615. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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original jurisdiction over the claims of at least one class member.6 This 
view was consistent with those taken by the Fourth,7 the Sixth,8 and 
the Seventh Circuits.9 The Fifth10 and the Ninth Circuits11 decided 
similarly that unnamed class members need not meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement, though those courts took no clear view on 
named members.12 
The First Circuit came to a different conclusion about the 
interpretation of § 1367 in Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.13 In 1999, 
nine-year-old Beatriz Blanco-Ortega suffered severe injuries after 
slicing her right pinky finger on a Star-Kist tuna can.14 She brought a 
diversity action in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico.15 
Her family members later joined under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 20, suing for medical expenses and emotional distress 
damages.16 The District Court granted summary judgment to Star-Kist 
after determining that no plaintiff could meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement.17 On appeal, the First Circuit reversed with 
respect to the girl, but affirmed as to the family members.18 It stated 
that § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction only when the district 
court has original jurisdiction and when every plaintiff meets the 
amount-in-controversy requirement—if a single plaintiff fails to 
satisfy this requirement, the court would not have supplemental 
 
 6. Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 7. Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 112 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the plain text of 
§ 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction in diversity class actions”). 
 8. See Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 2004) (overruling Zahn and 
holding that each class member need not meet the amount in controversy requirement). 
 9. See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(concluding that “Section 1367(a) has changed the basic rule by authorizing pendent-party 
jurisdiction, and that change affects Clark and Zahn equally”). 
 10. See Free v. Abbott Labs (In re Abbott Labs. Inc.), 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over class members that did not 
meet the amount-in-controversy requirement). 
 11. See Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 943 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that 28 
U.S.C § 1367 “provides supplemental jurisdiction over the jurisdictionally insufficient claims of 
unnamed class members if the named plaintiffs in the action have claims that satisfy the 
amount-in-controversy requirement”). 
 12. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2616 (2005). 
 13. See Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 133 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding, in joinder 
cases, that each plaintiff must meet the amount in controversy requirement). 
 14. Id. at 126. 
 15. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 144 (1st Cir. 2004) 
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jurisdiction.19 This view was shared by the Third,20 the Eighth,21 and the 
Tenth Circuits.22 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits had further applied 
this rule to class actions.23 
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict previously 
in Free v. Abbott Laboratories, but due to O’Connor’s absence the 
Court divided 4-4 without opinion.24 This time, in a 5-4 opinion 
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that “where the other 
elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in 
the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 
does authorize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other 
plaintiffs in the same Article III case or controversy”—regardless of 
whether each individual plaintiff meets the jurisdictional-amount 
requirement.25 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit’s Exxon decision was 
affirmed, and the First Circuit’s Ortega decision was reversed and 
remanded.26 
In Clark v. Paul Gray Inc., a federal-question case decided prior to 
the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Supreme Court held that each 
plaintiff must meet the amount-in-controversy requirement and the 
claims of those who do not meet the requirement must be dismissed.27 
In Zahn v. International Paper Co., this requirement was extended to 
class-action suits in which 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction 
was invoked.28 In 1989, the Court held in Finley v. United States that a 
district court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when a 
plaintiff added related claims against other defendants, prohibiting so-
 
 19. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616. 
 20. See Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(concluding “that a plaintiff with claims less than the jurisdictional amount may not invoke 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367”). 
 21. See Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (requiring “each plaintiff 
in a class action diversity case to satisfy the Zahn definition of ‘matter in controversy’ and to 
individually meet the $75,000 requirement”). 
 22. See Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding “that 
plaintiffs in a diversity class action must each satisfy that jurisdictional amount”). 
 23. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616. 
 24. Free v. Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333 (2000); Posting of Brian Fletcher, to SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/06/todays_opinion_2.html (June 23, 
2005, 13:01 EST). 
 25. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2615. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939). 
 28. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). 
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called “pendent-party” jurisdiction.29 Just months later, Congress 
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly 
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the 
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have 
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include 
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.30 
All parties in the consolidated cases agreed that § 1367 overruled 
Finley; yet the debate in these cases centered on whether Congress, 
when enacting this statute, also overruled Clark and Zahn.31 Because § 
1367 clearly allows supplemental jurisdiction once the court has 
original jurisdiction over a civil action, the critical question was 
“whether a diversity case in which the claims of some plaintiffs satisfy 
the amount-in-controversy requirement, but the claims of others 
plaintiffs do not, presents a ‘civil action of which the district courts 
have original jurisdiction.’”32 
The majority answered this question in the affirmative by first 
asserting that, assuming all other requirements were met, if one claim 
were to satisfy the amount-in-controversy, the district court would 
have original jurisdiction over that claim.33 Under § 1367(a), original 
jurisdiction over a single claim leads to original jurisdiction over the 
civil action. Once a court has original jurisdiction over the action, it 
can exercise supplementary jurisdiction over additional claims, 
including those involving joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
Because nothing in § 1367(b) specifically withheld supplemental 
jurisdiction over claims of plaintiffs joined by Rule 20 (as in Ortega) 
or by Rule 23 (as in Exxon) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
both district courts could have exercised supplemental jurisdiction.34 
The majority agreed with Allapattah,35 Ortega,36 and the 
 
 29. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). 
 31. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2631 (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 2620 (majority opinion). 
 33. Id. at 2620–21. 
 34. Id. at 2621. 
 35. Brief of Respondents at 17, Exxon, 125 S. Ct. 2611 (No. 04-70). 
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Government.37 The majority contended that the plain language of the 
statute required this result.38 It could not accept the alternative view, 
held by the other parties, that original jurisdiction over a civil action 
required original jurisdiction over every claim in a complaint.39 
The majority dismissed the indivisibility theory, which holds that 
all claims “must stand or fall as a single, indivisible ‘civil action,’”40 by 
asserting that the theory conflicts with supplemental jurisdiction.41 
According to the majority, the indivisibility theory is also inconsistent 
with the practice of allowing courts to dismiss only the parties that do 
not meet the jurisdiction requirements, rather than requiring them to 
dismiss the entire action. If the claims were indivisible, all would have 
to be dismissed.42 Additionally, this would require assigning a different 
meaning to the same language, “original jurisdiction” and “civil 
actions,” in 18 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 diversity jurisdiction.43 
The majority also rejected the contamination theory, under which 
the inclusion of a claim or a party outside of original jurisdiction 
deprives the court of original jurisdiction over all other claims.44 This 
theory is compatible with the complete diversity requirement because 
the potential state bias for all claims is eliminated by the presence of a 
non-diverse party, and hence the need for federal jurisdiction 
disappears.45 However, the majority maintained that it is incompatible 
with the amount-in-controversy requirement, which exists to assure 
that a dispute is sufficiently important to be heard in a federal venue; 
the presence of another party does not eliminate the importance of 
the dispute.46 Thus, the mere fact that both requirements are found in 
§ 1332 does not preclude the contamination theory from applying to 
both.47 
 
 36. Brief for Petitioners at 19, Exxon, 125 S. Ct. 2611 (No. 04-79). 
 37. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (No. 04-70). 
 38. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625. 
 39. Id. at 2621. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2621–22. 
 42. Id. at 2622. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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Justice Ginsburg, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, 
O’Connor, and Breyer, argued that the statute was open to a “less 
disruptive” and more compelling interpretation.48 The dissent argued 
that the phrase in § 1367(a), “any civil action of which the district 
courts have original jurisdiction,”49 should be read, in diversity cases, 
“to incorporate the rules on joinder and aggregation tightly tied to § 
1332 at time of § 1367’s enactment.”50 Thus, original jurisdiction can 
only be present if the complaint first meets the requirements of § 
1332, which incorporates the complete diversity rule and the decisions 
in Clark and Zahn.51 This interpretation, the dissent asserted, would 
explain why § 1367(b), which excluded certain claims from the grant 
of supplemental jurisdiction found in § 1367(a), did not include Rule 
20 plaintiffs or Rule 23 class actions. Congress did not need to exclude 
them because they were never included in § 1367(a).52 An additional 
virtue of this interpretation, in the dissent’s view, was that it preserved 
the judicially developed distinctions between pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction.53 The dissent argued further that its interpretation 
accorded better “with the historical and legal context of Congress’[s] 
enactment”54 of § 1367, and it asserted that close questions of 
statutory construction should be resolved against change.55 
The majority, however, found no need to consult such interpretive 
tools as the legislative history of the statute because, in its view, § 1367 
was not ambiguous.56 Furthermore, the majority argued, if it were 
appropriate to examine the legislative history, such evidence would 
not alter its view because, in this case and often in general, the 
legislative history was both murky and contentious.57 This assertion 
fueled Justice Stevens’s dissent, in which he contended that the 
legislative history explicitly stated that § 1367 was intended merely to 
overrule Finley, and specifically to avoid overruling Zahn.58 Justice 
Stevens found the majority’s reasons for not consulting the 
 
 48. Id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). 
 50. Exxon, 125 S. Ct at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2639. 
 53. Id. at 2638–39. 
 54. Id. at 2640–41. 
 55. Id. at 2641. 
 56. Id. at 2626–27 (majority opinion) 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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“uncommonly clear” legislative history unpersuasive.59 Justice Stevens 
further warned that it was “unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of a 
statute as determinative of whether legislative history is consulted,”60 
because, as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent showed, ambiguity is “in the eye 
of the beholder.”61 
Both Exxon and Allapattah claimed that the 2005 enactment of 
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)62 should alter the Court’s 
analysis. Subject to certain requirements, CAFA granted district 
courts original jurisdiction over any class action in which the 
aggregate amount-in-controversy exceeded five million dollars and in 
which at least partial diversity existed.63 CAFA, according to Exxon, 
demonstrated that if Congress were to amend § 1332, it would do so 
explicitly.64 Allapattah claimed that the passage of CAFA undermined 
Exxon’s appeal because the CAFA contradicted Exxon’s claim that 
Congress was opposed to diversity jurisdiction in class-action suits.65 
Further, Allapattah claimed that even if jurisdiction was found to be 
improper, the case could merely be refiled under CAFA.66 Despite 
these arguments, the majority concluded the opinion by asserting that 
CAFA in no way impacted the Court’s analysis.67 
Although the extent of jurisdiction allowed under § 1367 has been 
in controversy since its enactment,68 Allapattah may be correct in 
asserting that, in light of CAFA, the practical impact of this ruling is 
limited in the class action context: “Congress found that the 
determination of six of the courts of appeal that § 1367 had overruled 
Zahn had not materially impacted the filing or removal of diversity 
class actions in federal court.”69 The expansion of federal diversity 
 
 59. Id. at 2630–31. 
 60. Id. at 2628. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2005). 
 64. See Supplemental Brief of Exxon Corp. at 3, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005) (No. 04-70) (noting that “[w]hen Congress wants to alter 
dramatically the scope of diversity jurisdiction, it does so directly and unequivocally”). 
 65. Respondents’ Supplemental Merits Brief at 1, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005) (No. 04-70). 
 66. Id. at 2 
 67. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2627–28 (2005). 
 68. See generally Mark Hutcheson, Comment, Unintended Consequences: 28 U.S.C. 1367’s 
Effect on Diversity’s Amount in Controversy Requirement, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 247 (1996). 
 69. Respondents’ Supplemental Merits Brief, supra note 65, at 3 (citing S. Rep. No. 108-
123, at n.22–40 (2003)). 
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jurisdiction is seen as beneficial primarily to corporations, which often 
prefer federal courts over state courts because of the perceived state 
bias.70 However, the cases of particular concern to corporations—class 
actions with large damages—would already be covered by CAFA. 
Even if caseloads were to increase slightly, it may be worth it, as the 
overruling of Clark and Zahn can be seen as fostering “the efficient 
resolution of complex litigation.”71 
Nonetheless, given the split among the Courts of Appeals and the 
longstanding debate, the majority may have reached the wrong 
interpretation. If this result were truly outside of Congress’s intent, a 
Finley-type congressional fix would be expected. Given the enactment 
of CAFA, demonstrating Congress’s willingness to expand diversity 
jurisdiction, and the limited effect that the overruling of Zahn is seen 
to have, this fix appears unlikely. 
 
 
 70. See generally Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice Between State and Federal Courts, 46 
S.C. L. REV. 961, 967 (1995). 
 71. Mark C. Cawley, Note, The Right Result for the Wrong Reasons: Permitting 
Aggregation of Claims Under 28 U.S.C. 1367 in Multi-Plaintiff Diversity Litigation, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1045, 1076 (1998). 
